The year 2000 saw the creation of a new institution of local democracy, 'a constitutional experiment' as one of its senior officers has dubbed it -the Greater London Authority (GLA). This was the end of a period of 14 years in which a major world city lived without a metro-level government. Since the demise of the Greater London Council, the 32 London boroughs and the Corporation of the City of London had been left to deal with strategic urban issues of waste management, transport policy and urban development planning, to name but a few, alongside the regional government of central government, the Government Office for London, agencies such as London Transport and the Local Ecology Unit, and a variety of boards and committees dealing with, for example, the fire and emergency services or advice on London planning from the boroughs. It was broadly accepted that the resulting 'structure; was a dis-coordinated mess, which left some issues under considered (for example, air quality), left others to central government management (such as public transport) and created a space, which business interests rapidly sought to fill by a variety of mechanisms such as London First (Newman and Thornley1997). The replacement of metro-level government, in the form of the GLC, by a mixture of organisations and networks can be considered the rise of a form of urban governance (Stoker 2000) but it was hardly a triumph.
In this paper, we begin by setting out the key parameters of the cultural theory framework. Then we describe some of the key features of the GLA, its organisational structure and institutional arrangements, before going on to apply the cultural theory typology to this specific case. After concluding on the existence and extent of a 'clash of cultures' in the GLA, we reflect on cultural theory as a framework and assess its value, its strengths and limitations. While our research focussed particularly on the GLA in the context of spatial development and environmental strategies, we believe that the findings have a much broader interest. However, this focus does mean that we have not examined the internal workings of the functional bodies, as none of the bodies are directly responsible for these policy areas and are, strictly speaking, not part of the GLA organisation but part of the broader GLA 'family'.
Cultural Theory as an Analytic Framework
Cultural theory (of the variety being used here) derives from the work of Mary Douglas within anthropology, as extended by her collaboration with Aaron Wildavsky into policy contexts. The basic tool of the theory is the 2x2 matrix. On the 'grid' axis is measured the extent to which lives are circumscribed by convention or rules; a high grid view proposes that such rules and conventions should dominate individuals' lives, while a low grid view proposes the opposite. On the 'group' axis is measured the extent to which individual choice is constrained by group choice; thus, a high group view proposes that choices made by individuals should be subordinate to groups decisions. Clearly both of these dimensions relate to spectrums of change but for the sake of simplicity, they are reduced to polar opposites. In some accounts (such as Ellis and Thompson 1997), such polar opposites necessarily arise because of the inevitable choice between openness and closure in societies and between strong and weak connectedness, so that spectrums become reduced to bipolar positions. Either way, combining these two dimensions produces a four-fold typology: Grid refers to the extent to which lives are circumscribed by convention or rules. Group refers to the extent to which individual choice is constrained by group choice.
The four categories so derived are 'myths' of human nature or worldviews. That is, they describe narratives or storylines that people and institutions use to simplify their views of reality and to tie up values and norms with such views. They are not myths in the sense of being untrue or fictions, but rather myths in the sense of being social constructions, value-laden and normative as well as descriptive. Briefly, these four worldviews are as follows:
Fatalist This describes a position in which there is little scope for active management of lives or life chances. Fate and chance rule outcomes and there is little individuals or their institutions can do; therefore, the group dimension is low. However, the grid dimension remains high since such a society or group will co-operate by means of relatively rigid conventions in the absence of any other more proactive mechanism for giving meaning to social action and being.
Individualist The individualist position stresses both the significance of individual choice and the unimportance of social conventions and rules in circumscribing behaviour. This is a view in which there are significant opportunities for everyone if only they will take them.
Hierarchist This is the pre-eminently modern worldview in which group conventions and control dominate. Individuals are subordinated to the collective, in the name of a greater good, a public interest. It is, however, an optimistic worldview since the belief of attaining that good through group decisions in maintained.
Egalitarian Finally, in this view the importance of group decision-making over the individual is maintained but there is openness with regard to the operation of rules and conventions.
While this is clearly a simplification, this framework can help clarify complex reality and form a basis for comparison and classification. It can also be elaborated to fit with specific situations. This is the approach that Hood has taken in trying to apply cultural theory to public management (see also Adams' work applying cultural theory to risk management; 1995). Hood has used the framework to argue that there are different types of contemporary public management, in opposition to the commonly held view that there is one dominant form of new public management (NPM). In elaborating this, he has proposed a model of four different types of public management, each associated with one of these worldviews. This is summarised in Figure 2 . How useful is this typology to help us classify the emerging institutions of the GLA? These early months have been marked by considerable dynamism, repeated change in policy approaches, even in staff and organisational structure and a certain amount of jockeying for power and influence among key actors. In such a context, it is ambitious enough to try and impose some order on the multiplicity of detail and rapid chance. The use of the cultural theory typology can help do just this.
The Organisation of the GLA Cultural theory, with its emphasis on norms, values and working practices, seeks to analyse much more than the organisational structure of bodies such as the GLA. As the language adopted above implies, it looks at the institutions of the GLA. By the term 'institution' is meant the mix of organisational arrangements together with the everyday norms and rules of policy and management practice that these arrangements carry and, indeed, embody. It suggests that the actual practices of the GLA are determined by more that the arrangement of divisions and departments; it is the way that these arrangements are brought to life by social practices that is important. In applying cultural theory, we will explore these social dimensions of relationships between actors in the GLA more fully, but we begin by setting out the basic organisational structures.
As Figure 4 indicates, there are a number of key elements to the organisational structure of the GLA. The main elements identified, for example, in the legislation and the GLA's own material are the Mayor, the Assembly and the Functional Bodies. Of these, the Mayor and the Assembly are directly elected: the Mayor by a vote for a named person; and the Assembly through two sets of votes, one for set for the 14 constituency members and one for the 11 members from a list, designed to achieve some degree of proportionality in the make-up of the Assembly. In May 2000, the votes cast gave the Mayoralty to Ken Livingstone, ex-Labour MP standing as an Independent and led to the Assembly being hung, with 9 Conservative, 9 Labour, 4 Liberal-Democrat and 3 Green members.
There are four functional bodies, arm's length agencies, which run important panLondon services: -Transport for London (much in the news for the appointments of a high profile American director and for clashes with central government over financial and legal arrangements); -the London Development Agency (the London equivalent of the Regional Development Agencies, responsible for urban regeneration budgets and holder of some important sites previously owned by the LDDC/English Partnership); -the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority (handling issues previously covered by an ad-hoc board); and -the Metropolitan Policy Authority (for the first time, shifting control of London's police from the Home Office to local government). As noted above, we will deal with these functional bodies only tangentially. It should be noted though that all these functional bodies are effectively under the direction of the Mayor. This is particularly the case with TfL, where the Mayor sets the budget (subject to Assembly approval), appoints the Board and has wide powers of direction; Ken Livingstone has chosen to sit personally as Chair of the Board. With the LDA, the Mayor appoints the Chair and the Board; Assembly members may be asked to sit on the Board but otherwise have only a consultative and scrutiny role. The LFEPA has nine Assembly members on its Board, but these are appointed by the Mayor, who also appoints the Chair and sets the budget. Similarly with the MPA, the Assembly provides 12 members and the Mayor appoints these members and sets the budget; the Metropolitan Police Commissioner is still appointed by the Home Secretary.
The directed elected elements are supported by two bureaucracies: the Mayor's Office of some 30 staff (about a dozen of whom are policy advisors), which (as the name implies) reports directly to the Mayor, and the GLA bureaucracy, currently about 250 but eventually comprising some 400 staff. This bureaucracy incorporated certain pre-existing bodies, which had developed a role during the inter-regnum: the London Ecology Unit, the London Planning Advisory Committee; and the London Research Centre. Originally, this bureaucracy had to serve both the Mayor and the Assembly and this dual role for the bureaucracy created some tensions. The Assembly does have a budget to appoint its own consultants and support staff and this has now been increased to resolve these tensions. Finally, the figure identifies two other bodies: the set of Mayor's advisors both paid and unpaid who work directly to him; and the Mayor's Cabinet comprising members from the Assembly as well as the Mayor and some of his appointees. 
From Organisations to Institutions
This organogram gives only the bare bone of the GLA. What about the institutional arrangements, the flavour of the relationships between elements and of relationships to outside bodies? What about the values, norms and developing working practices? Our research has indicated that separate working patterns have already built up around the organisational structures, in effect creating three distinct institutions within the GLA that have to co-exist and try to work together. These institutional, as opposed to organisational arrangements are summarised in Figure 5 . We will briefly elaborate on this summary, before addressing the question of whether cultural theory can add to this account.
Figure 5
The Three Institutions of the GLA This has ensured continuity in the close working relationships built up during the campaign and before the election. While this small team does not necessarily seek to work in a very secretive and exclusionary manner, it is nevertheless clear that benefits of common thinking and mutual knowledge make this a very difficult institution to join from the outside. This is accentuated by the explicit attempts to maintain close, even personal control of the work of this team by the Mayor. One senior officer described it as 'quite a corporate body'.
Influence on the team, and therefore on the Mayor, is mainly by invitation. There is, of course, a huge amount of lobbying that occurs by outside interests, but the very volume of this lobbying means that only selected groups can have any influence and that selection is at the discretion of the team. Key interests that do appear to have some influence on the Mayoral agenda are those appointed to his group of policy advisors and (to a lesser extent) his Cabinet. Again, these appointments are by invitation. The variable but, at times, almost daily contact with these selected consultees make the widely publicised and much larger open events -such as the 'Meet The Mayor' open question forums -pale into insignificance. In a similar vein the role of the various Policy Commissions, set up by the Mayor to investigate specific issues, have been seen by some as a controlled means of getting messages to the Mayor, rather than a really open consultative process. In terms of Mayoral agenda, it is equally clear that there is a fairly simple dynamic at work here and that is the pursuit of re-election in 2004. Hence the benchmark for the policy agenda is two fold: does it relate to the Manifesto on which Ken Livingstone was elected; and does it promote the chances of re-election?
Translating this political agenda into a policy agenda results in a very clear focus on a limited number of projects that are deemed salient with the electorate and where the results of the Mayoral system can be demonstrated. There is a concentration of policy effort within the Mayor's office on overcoming the barriers to implementing these projects. Currently, this boils the agenda down to improvement of the London Underground system and achieving congestion charging; the two are inter-related since the money raised by congestion charging will be a key source of funding for Mayoral projects. This emphasis on the demonstrable and the electorally-salient has also led the Mayor to maintain close personal control over development control decisions, at least in the first period of the GLA and until his personal 'policy' on deciding planning applications is established. The Mayor is a statutory consultee on all applications of 'potential strategic importance' and has the power to direct refusals of permission.
This emphasis on the a personal Mayoral agenda has meant that a premium is placedby the Mayor's Office and others in the GLA -on establishing and clarifying Livingstone's vision. As we will explore below, this has not always been straight-forward in the context of the GLA. Initially the agenda was to be set in the form of a London Prospectus, which was due to be launched at a public forum in November 2000. This was delayed and now appears to have been shelved in favour of using the Spatial Development Strategy to convey the Mayor's vision. We also discuss this further below.
By contrast the policy officers within the bureaucracy are following a very different line. While they have all been newly appointed to the GLA, most of the key officers have a background in the organisations absorbed into the GLA -the London Planning Advisory Committee, the London Ecology Unit and the London Research Centre -or even in the old Greater London Council. The current GLA group of policy officers, therefore, brings considerable expertise and knowledge to the task and, indeed in many cases, began back in July 2000 with drafts of the various strategies already on their desks. For example, LPAC had prepared their own 'legacy' to the GLA which they hoped would set out the basic structure of the new Spatial Development Strategy; both the GLA's principal planning officer Martin Simmons and the current Deputy Mayor, Nicky Gavron were involved in preparing this legacy.
These officers also have long experience of local government policy systems and operate with a clear understanding of the statutory requirements on and duties of local government. They represent a professional commitment to medium/long term policy development through strategies and policy frameworks. This drives an agenda based around strategy development, strategy co-ordination and the attempt to impose a rational and holistic framework on the workings of the GLA. This is given organisational expression in various ways. There is the existence within the strategy directorate of a specific unit designed to pursue cross-cutting themes, which run across the individual strategies. The GLA is committed to eight statutory strategies (transport, spatial development, economic development, culture, air quality, biodiversity, waste and noise) and two non-statutory strategies (energy and housing). These are supposed to be coordinated with reference to themes of equality/inclusion/social integration, sustainability and health, and also, more recently, housing. Co-ordination is also achieved through each strategy being examined within a strategy co-ordination group of lead officers, although the time available for this is limited and such examination can only occur on the basis of a fairly fully-developed draft.
Developing this number of strategies and attempting to ensure that they mesh together is a major call on officers' time and resources. The shift of organisations such as LPAC and LEU into the GLA, while appearing to enhance their power, in some cases led to a reallocation of staff away from previously core-functions. For example, the LEU has lost half its pre-GLA staff to other tasks. GLA officers are also available to Assembly members for a certain amount of their time and they have to work on the Mayor's agenda as well as their professionally driven strategy framework. Indeed, in formal terms, the Mayor has priority in establishing the focus of their work.
The Assembly comprises 25 elected representatives representing geographical constituencies and also broader London-wide interests. Most commentators on the proposals for the GLA argued that the role of the Assembly was anomalous. Indeed there was little clear role set out for the Assembly in the White Paper or the legislation beyond a poorly-defined scrutiny role and an annual vote on the Mayor's budget (where a substantial majority is required to veto the Mayor's plans). Power was clear vested in the Mayor, in the first instance, not the Assembly. Yet in the event, a number of wellknown and well-connected people from the three main parties were elected to the Assembly along with three new and enthusiastic Green members. Such an Assembly was unlikely to accept a back-stop scrutiny role. Instead it has actively searched for a role, reinterpreting scrutiny to include 'pre-scrutiny' of Mayoral proposals before they are fully developed and implemented, as well as investigation after drafting through the mechanism of Investigation Committees comprising 5/6 Assembly members.
The Assembly has actively looked for issues it can investigate and has prioritised the theme of accountability of a Mayor-dominated GLA. Recently, the Assembly Planning Committee, which had not met between July and January, has been reconvened and has requested the Mayor to invite contributions from them on planning applications of potential strategic importance; (this circumlocution indicates the balance of power!) This committee then censured the Mayor for refusing this request (Planning Committee meeting 28.2.01). It has also sought to promote its own distinct views on the various Unitary Development Plans put forward to the GLA. In the case of the Westminster UDP, this meant that the Assembly committee found itself supporting the borough and opposing the Mayor by opposing tall buildings and an increase in the amount of affordable housing in new developments (Evening Standard 5.3.01 'Battle lines in sky as Mayor and assembly square up'). The Environment Committee has also not been shy to criticise the Mayor's strategies, such as the LDA strategy for its lack of attention to sustainability principles (Environment Committee meeting 13.2.01).
Towards a Cultural Theory Analysis
Comparing the framework of Figure 2 with these details of the early workings of the GLA, suggests that there are indeed different cultures at work. While (like any typology) the fit is not exact, there are strong parallels between these institutions and three of the worldviews. This can be explored by taking each institution in turn.
While it might seem surprising at first glance to associate 'Red Ken' of the New Left GLC with an individualist perspective, there are close congruences, for the Mayor is following a highly individualist agenda. The approach is, as predicted, atomized, focused on specific projects and individuals. There is a heavy emphasis on negotiation and bargaining on these specific projects, and the GLA becomes essentially an arena for promoting them. So, regardless of Ken Livingstone's personal ideology, he appears to be a culturally individualist Mayor. In fact, some commentators have argued that Mayor Livingstone explicitly did not want to be associated with a socialist political agenda; hence, his early overtures to the business community and the attractions of a nonideological Green agenda during the election campaign. This also fits with the apparent desire of Ken Livingstone, that some have noted, to leave a long-term mark on London from his Mayoralty, a personal legacy. One area where this is particularly pronounced is in Livingstone's overt pursuit of a personal design policy on planning matters, with a preference for tall buildings and a willingness to state whether he finds a building ugly or not.
What of the other aspects of individualist public management? Much of Hood's analysis is drawn up in terms of classic Thatcherite NPM, based on contracts and price-based incentives. Clearly Livingstone's style cannot be reduced to this. However, the individualist culture does prioritise the assumption of individual self-interest and this assumption is central to Mayoral strategies. The electorate -his prime focus -are seen in terms of individuals concerned with their self-interest; the task of the Mayor is to improve their lot. And while the media has focused on conflicts between the Mayor and central government over how the Underground should be financed, framing this in terms of public versus private sectors involvement, in reality the range of options being considered all have a strong element of market incentives within them. Livingstone is not proposing a traditional public-sector owned service provided free and financed collectively; rather his policy package includes road pricing (a classic market-based instrument), floating bonds on the capital markets and charging for use of public transport. It is the mix of tools and the locus of control over their use that is at issue, not the underlying principle.
It is also clear that Ken Livingstone actually opposes key elements of the hierarchist and egalitarian approaches, both in his statements and his practice. Our interview with Ken Livingstone confirmed his antipathy to strategies as opposed to specific projects since, in his view, strategies are unlikely to change anything overnight. This also fits with the view of a key advisor that the Mayor's Office is actually rather inexperienced in interfacing or 'handling' a hierarchical bureaucracy. He is also not following an egalitarian consultative approach. When asked about whether public consultation would influence him, his reply was: 'when my mind is made up, not a chance'. The reality of much consultation during the first year of the GLA has been a failure to live up to promises or expectations. Many of the larger events appear to have been window-dressing rather than a genuine input into decision-making. Some Commissions, for example the SDS Commission has taken a variety of innovative forms; others, such as the Environment Commission, have been rather unstructured and produced a raft of demands for Mayoral action. More recently, these commissions have been sidelined in favour of internal discussion on policy priorities and details.
By contrast, the bureaucracy fits well within the hierarchist culture. The policy officers emphasise a way of working which is rule bound, socially cohesive, based on expertise and clearly identified 'ladders of authority'. They have devoted considerable time to developing strategies to steer and guide the actions of the GLA and are considerably frustrated when the project-based electoral politics of the Mayor conflict with development such an holistic policy framework. There is also a clash of timetable involved since the project-based timetable of the Mayoral agenda pays little attention to the statutory requirements for a fixed timetable for certain strategies or the time implications of preparing such a package of inter-related strategies. And the officers feel aggrieved when their considerable expertise is not valued by the Mayoral team or bypassed by outside, invited advisors. With the Mayor having first call on the officers' time, the remaining space for preparing strategies in line with professional expectations is severely curtailed. This is frustrating from the perspective of the hierarchist officer, but further, when they do find time, they are likely to follow their own line of working rather than integrate closely with the individualist Mayoral agenda.
Another dimension to this conflict of worldviews is to be found in the differing view of the GLA's place within governmental structures. As mentioned above, most of the officers (except significantly the Chief Executive) come from local government and seem content to see the GLA retain a local government perspective within an overall hierarchy. From the Mayoral office, however, there seems to be a wish to see London in terms of regional government and as a major player on the European governmental and world economic scene. The attention to policy detail associated with the hierarchist view of those grounded in local government and used to fearing the ultra vires rule, contrasts with the individualist view of a Mayor seeking to push at the boundaries of conventional sub-national government and create new opportunities. The conflict between the individualist Mayoral culture and the hierarchist bureaucracy culture will be explored further below.
This leaves the Assembly which approximates closely to the egalitarian culture. Here is a forum which, in the absence of a clearly defined role and limited resources or powers, has defined itself in terms of maintaining the accountability of the GLA. As such it is drawing on its own accountability as an elected body, holding meetings in public and keeping a watching brief on the activities of the Mayor and bureaucracy. Despite the advice of officers, the Assembly decided to opt for early rather than late scrutiny, explicitly because they wished to reign in the Mayor (evidence from early Assembly meeting). Officers were pushing for later scrutiny because of problems it might cause for strategy development in terms of officer workload, lack of clear policy direction and multiplicity of priorities.
In the face of the relatively closed world of the other two institutions, the Assembly is emphasising its role in maintaining community participation. The selective consultation that forms the basis of the Mayoral culture has already been explored. The attitude of the bureaucracy towards public consultation is also rather ambiguous. Such consultation tends to be professionalised; it is acceptable only through established conduits. Certainly the main focus of officers' strategy development work has been internal to the GLA. Hence an open approach to consultation is a 'gap' that the Assembly can step into in its search for a role. It may not, of course, be a role that it will succeed in filling.
There is an issue how far party-alignments affect consultation via the Assembly. At the moment, the hung nature of the Assembly combined with an independent Mayor is restricting party-politics and opening up consultation. With an Assembly controlled by a party and/or a partisan -rather than independent -Mayor, parties may become a more significant channels of influence. It is also unclear as yet how the non-constituency basis of some Assembly members will play out. Can they really be a conduit for London-wide interests? Certainly, boroughs have expressed disappointment at the way that the Assembly is representing their interests and have sought direct access to the Mayor instead. It may be, whatever the role of the Assembly in involving outside interests, the relative power of the Mayor will result in frustration at not getting directly to the decision makers in the Mayor's office and in the bureaucracy.
In any case, the Assembly-route to participation represents only one particular definition of participation. As Figure 2 makes clear there are four possible models of community participation within the egalitarian worldview. These include traditional collegia alongside alternative communities and transformational political groupings; but the elected Assembly falls within one model of egalitarian public management, an elite electorally representative group. It is this model that its current operation emphasises, claiming legitimacy for this role through the election of its members. In this context, it is interesting to note the slightly different claims to legitimacy of the constituency-based members of the Assembly -who were elected directly on a named and party basis and those elected from the list. Constituency members have been known to claim greater legitimacy, opening up the potential for a rift within the Assembly, which might undermine it. Political parties might play a significant role here in keeping groups within the Assembly together, but would do so, of course, at the cost of creating different lines of partisan cleavage.
The Potential for Conflict and Integration
The cultural theory framework appears to have some value, therefore, in clarifying the institutions associated with the GLA and distinguishing them. It can further help in understanding where conflicts and tensions might arise in the working practices of the GLA. The discussion has already highlighted how the hierarchist bureaucracy finds itself frustrated by the individualist politics of the Mayor; and the way that this expresses itself in terms of prioritising the staff's work and time. It has also been shown that both the Mayor and the bureaucracy find themselves having to defend themselves against the egalitarian approach of the Assembly with its emphasis on new lines of accountability.
There are other specific examples of emerging conflicts of culture within the GLA., within the fields of spatial planning and environmental policy. Three of these will now be explored: the discussions around the sustainable development principles; the interrelationship of different strategies; and the recent history of the Spatial Development Strategy.
While the Mayor ran a campaign with a distinctly 'greenish' tinge, the idea of a set of Sustainable Development Principles to run across all the policy work of the GLA appears to have emanated from within the bureaucracy, particularly given the strong commitment to sustainable development of both LPAC and the LEU and their lead officers. This was also in line with the responsibilities of the GLA as set down in legislation and national policy. A first draft of these principles was appended to a report to the Mayor's Office in September 2000 and considerable effort expended in circulating these around the GLA, amending them in line with comment and discussion. They rapidly went through numerous revisions, ending with Draft 13 coming forward in February 2001.
However, the later revisions were not of an incremental nature implied by an evolving policy stance. Rather it appears that the SD Principles developed within the bureaucracy and without the Mayor's Office giving them much weight. This became very apparent during the preparation of the London Development Strategy. The SD Principles were used in the first draft, resulting in an approach that was not to the liking of the LDA Chief Executive. Later versions rather delinked the Strategy from the SD Principles, prompting criticism from the Assembly. As the LDS came under criticism from this perspective, the Mayor's Office focused attention directly on the Principles and promptly sought to revise them. Hence, the 13 th version has had much of the socio-economic emphasis of earlier versions removed, so that it is much more environmental in nature, rather than attempting the social-economic-environmental synthesis that should lie at the heart of sustainable development. At the same time, the Sustainable Development Commission -promised in the Mayor's report to the Assembly on 15.11.00 -has not materialised, so that the Mayor is relying on ad hoc consultation of selected stakeholders for a sounding board. Similarly, the officers' desire for a batch of sustainability indicators is being overridden by the Mayor's desire for a single GLA Quality of Life Index, effectively an indicator of the Mayor's electability.
Another story of conflict between a Mayoral approach and that of the bureaucracy can be told in respect of the relationships between the various strategies. The bureaucracy, as indicated above, have been concerned with fulfilling the statutory requirements to produce a series of strategies and to ensure that these reinforce rather than contradict each other. The Mayor, however, has seen the transport strategy as key to his personal agenda. This has created two sets of problems.
First, the Mayoral view of a transport strategy was much more specific and focused than the bureaucracy's, with a much greater emphasis on providing an operational framework for the management of London's public transport. The initial version was effectively replaced in Autumn 2000 with a version that was more 'on message' as far as the Mayor's agenda was concerned. Following this, 'whiteboarding' sessions between the Mayor's Office and the bureaucracy were introduced, as a way of ensuring that senior officers were appraised of the Mayor's views and did not develop strategies in an insulated professional context. These sessions have also effectively side-lined the more open-ended consultation of various Policy Commissions, which was originally supposed to feed into policy development. Secondly, given the prioritisation of transport within the Mayoral agenda, the timing of preparation of different strategies has been amended to avoid political problems. This has particularly affected the air quality strategy, which proposed various traffic control measures to alleviated air pollution. This was delayed so that its measures were not seen as 'ratcheting up' the congestion charging measures already contained in the transport strategy, and thereby creating a political backlash.
This way the two strategies were clearly distanced from each other in the consultation process.
Finally, we turn to the story of the Spatial Development Strategy (SDS). In one sense, this has been in the pipeline for years. LPAC's endowment was clearly meant to establish a basis for the SDS and, therefore, officers within the bureaucracy hoped that work on the strategy could move ahead fairly quickly. From this perspective, the SDS could act as a horizontal strategy, linking all the others together through the spatial dimension. Some difficulties emerged during the first six months; the work within the bureaucracy on a plan which would fulfill certain statutory functions had to mesh with 'Blue Skies' approach of the Deputy Mayor, as she sought to bring in new ideas and visions of what London could be through the Spatial Development Policy Commission and various ad hoc meetings and workshops. It is reported that the SDS underwent 15 revisions over two months during this period, that it grew exponentially in size and had to be professionally rewritten to get it into coherent shape. In early February, the senior officer in charge was reporting 40 separate projects inputting into the SDS proposals. Nevertheless, progress was made and, as at 18.11.00, the Mayor's Management Board reported that an initial outline of the SDS -the SDS proposals -were expected on 5.12.00 and would go to the Assembly on 29.1.01. Thereafter, there would be a period of consultation and preparation of the final strategy, which would be subject to and Examination in Public, probably in Summer 2002.
Hearings by the Assembly's SDS Investigative Committee were set for March 2001 but, on the day of the first hearing on 1.3.01, these were cancelled. The SDS proposals had been withdrawn by the Mayor, who was concerned about their direction, particularly given that the SDS would become a material consideration for all planning decisions in the capital. Although it appears that the Mayor's Office had previously had little interest in the SDS (leaving it to the Deputy Mayor), it now sought to draw up a new alternative. This was dubbed The London Plan and was intended to encompass more effectively the Mayor's vision. Indeed The London Plan now became the main vehicle for expressing this vision, particularly given the cancellation of the Mayor's Prospectus. The new proposals were issued on 8.5.01 with a view to preparing a new draft SDS by the end of 2001.
This replacement of SDS Proposals (prepared within the bureaucracy) by Towards The London Plan (prepared by the Mayor's Office) is unlikely to be the end of this story. The tensions remain between:
-a plan which expresses a highly personalised vision for London, with a timescale driven by electoral politics and which is supposed to provide an innovative view of what the city could be like; and -a statutory document with a role within the land use planning system, supposed to set a framework for up to 20 years of development in London and constrained by the need to rake account of a whole raft of policy documentation, including regional planning guidance, planning policy guidance notes, EU directives, Government Office for London guidance and DETR White Papers; a count of these various documents suggests 18 other policy statements that need to be considered.
A clash between bureaucracy and Mayoralty, between hierarchalist and individualist institutional cultures seems like to be a fairly persistent feature of the GLA in this area.
The Prospects for the GLA All these examples show how, at the moment, the conflicts between different cultures have severe implications for the GLA. They results in an internal politics of conflict which is demoralising for some staff and absorbs resources. Given the current strength of the Mayor under Ken Livingstone, with his undoubted energy and skills, these conflicts often result in the hierarchist approach being downgraded. This may have implications for the future working of the GLA given that an integrated, co-ordinated strategy framework may not be achieved. Where there are statutory functions and responsibilities involved, this will have future repercussions. The statutory inquiry into the SDS may be less satisfactorily concluded or other agencies and local authorities may find themselves in a situation of policy conflict or uncertainty as a result. Given this, what are the prospects for integration across cultures within the GLA? There are a number of different ways in which such integration may arise.
Firstly, individuals may play an important role. There are some personnel who sit in more than one organisational seat and can straddle two cultures; examples include Gavron and Johnson, both of whom are members of the Assembly and part of the Mayor's team. Gavron seems less likely to fulfil such a role as she appears to be trying to emulate the individualist politics of Livingstone; Johnson may be more pivotal but it is noteworthy that one senior Mayoral advisor saw his role as 'steering' Johnson to fit in with Mayoral agenda. Secondly, changes in organisational structure may occur which removes some of the potential for conflict by seeking to give more prominence to one culture. The Chief Executive of the GLA, Anthony Meyer has pursued a general restructuring of the GLA while the strategy directorate has also been restructured in an explicit attempt to make it clear that the officers are under Mayoral control. The 'whiteboarding' process, discussed above, is an unofficial way of achieving the same end, i.e. of getting the officers 'on message'. Thirdly, staff turnover may result in new officers being appointed who are more in keeping with the prevailing Mayoral approach, limiting the prospects for tension. Fourthly, the priorities of the GLA may become more clearly established so that some strategies become prominent, while others tend to sit on the shelf. Because of its statutory role within the planning system, the SDS is probably the most hierarchical of the strategies and, therefore, attempts may be made to downgrade the SDS, for example by making it excessively general. Fifthly, it may be that strategies as a whole will be downgraded compared to a project-based focus, already favoured by the Mayor. This would leave policy areas, outside the favoured project of the moment, to be dealt with by officers (if it falls within their strategy framework) or even the Assembly (if they select an area for specific attention). The real policy action would, however, occur within these larger projects. The LDA, with its project-oriented London Development Strategy, may become the lead body in this case.
If the tensions currently inherent within GLA are not resolved by some means, there are real dangers for the future of the organisation. Hood's cultural theory framework for public management also identifies the key weaknesses of each approach. In the worst case, the individualist is prone to corruption, but also more significantly to secrecy and 'behind closed doors' dealings; the hierarchist to policy failure; and the egalitarian can degenerate into coexistence/internal feuding. This holds out the prospect of an overly powerful Mayor exerting undue influence while the bureaucracy fails to implement any of its strategies and the Assembly squabble among themselves. This does not seem entirely unrealistic. And then there is always the danger of fatalism developing within the GLA, a feature not uncommon with the rest of British local government but notably absent during the exciting first months of the GLA.
The Prospects for Cultural Theory
This discussion has suggested that cultural theory has some significant strengths for analysing an emergent institutional framework such as the GLA. It is clearly a descriptive heuristic which can be very useful, particularly in highly dynamic and complex situations such as the GLA in its early months. It is particularly useful because it does not just focus on the formal organisational structure and powers/resources of actors but goes beyond to look at the norms, values and working patterns that actually constitute the GLA. As we have seen, these aspects are the key to understanding the tensions that are becoming apparent in the operations of the authority. Cultural theory has also been able to suggest how such tensions might be resolved and the potential pathways if they are not. In this way, cultural theory can effectively offer a research agenda for future investigations into the GLA as it develops and, perhaps, becomes a more coherent, and unified body. The five possible modes of resolution of tensions identified in the last section provide an intriguing agenda for such future research.
However, there are clear limitations on cultural theory, particular in terms of seeking an explanation of the patterns that it helps describe. There is no causal model of any significance at the root of cultural theory and, therefore, it would need to be supplemented if the basis of these tensions is to be fully understood. This would involving examining how the power and resources of different actors is involved in developing these distinct cultures within the different institutions of the GLA. Neither does cultural theory help anticipate the analysis of change; rather it focuses on institutions as stable forms of patterning for organisations and their operations. Again, one would need to go outside cultural theory -perhaps to exogenous factors operating outside the local level -to understand how change affecting the GLA will occur. But, as a first step towards understanding an emerging and still highly dynamic institutional arrangement, that is struggling to develop working patterns and relationships between actors, cultural theory seems to have much to offer.
